Message Text

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ACTION EA-13

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R 230600Z AUG 73 FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2699 INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY SAIGON USLO PEKING CINCPAC

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E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, MILI, CB, UR

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET CHARGE' AT PHNOM PENH

- 1. SOVIET CHARGE' YURI SHMANEVSKI CAME TO SEE ENDERS AUGUST 22 TO GET OUR VIEWS OF THE LOCAL SITUATION.
- 2. CITING THE NIXON-BREZHNEV COMMUNIQUE, SHMANEVSKI ASKED WHETHER THERE WASN'T SOME WAY THE CURRENT LULL AROUND PHNOM PENH COULD BE USED TO GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. HE ASKED FOR OUR VIEW OF WHAT HE CALLED THE INSURGENTS' JULY 21 "PEACE PROPOSALS". WOULDN'T IT BE POSSIBLE, SHMANEVSKI ASKED, TO ENGINEER AN EVOLUTION IN THE GKR LEADERSHIP, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS RENT BY INTERNAL QUARRELING, SO THAT AN ENTIRELY NEW GROUP MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE INSURGENTS CAME TO POWER? HE MENTIONED CHAU SAU AND THE DEMOCRATS AS THE POSSIBLE REPLACEMENTS, SAYING THAT THE INSURGENTS WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM THAN WITH THE PRESENT GROUP, CONFIDENTIAL

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BUT ADDING THAT EVEN IN THAT CASE ONE COULD NOT BE SURE

THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE.

- 3. WE REPLIED THAT THE INSURGENTS' JULY 21 POSITION COULD NOT IN OUR VIEW BE PROPERLY CALLED A NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL. IT WAS AT BEST A CALL FOR AN ORDERLY SURRENDER BY THE GKR (SHMANEVSKI AGREED). REGARDING THE REPLACEMENT OF THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP BY A NEW ONE, WE COULD NOT SEE HOW CHAU SAU AND THE DEMOCRATS WOULD BE ABLE TO ORGANIZE A MORE EFFECTIVE DEFENSE OF PHNOM PENH THAN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT; INDEED, EVERYTHING SUGGESTED THAT THEY WOULD BE MUCH WEAKER. IF THE INSURGENTS THOUGHT THEY COULD WIN AGAINST THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND THUS REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE, WOULDN'T THEY BE EVEN MORE INTRANSIGENT AGAINST A WEAKER REPLACEMENT? SHMANEVSKI THOUGHT THEY MIGHT WELL BE.
- 4. SHMANEVSKI THEN QUERIED OUR VIEW OF THE INSURGENCY. DIDN'T WE THINK THAT IT WAS SPLIT DOWN THE MIDDLE BETWEEN IN-COUNTRY AND THE PEKING GROUPS, WITH THE LATTER HAVING LITTLE REAL POWER? WE RESPONDED THAT OF COURSE THE BASIC POWER WAS WITH THE IN-COUNTRY INSURGENTS. BUT SIHANOUK'S PERSONAL STANDING ABROAD AND TO A LESSER EXTENT WITHIN CAMBODIA ARE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ASSETS, AS IS THE RELATIVE SUCCESS THE GRUNK HAS HAD IN THE THIRD WORLD.
- 5. SHMANEVSKI THEN ASKED HOW WE SAW THE SITUATION EVOLVING IN PHNOM PENH. WE SAID WE THOUGHT THE INSURGENTS FACED A DIFFICULT CHOICE. IF THEY FAILED TO ATTACK NOW THAT U.S. AIR POWER HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN THEY COULD SUFFER A MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFEAT; THE GKR WOULD SHOW THAT IT COULD STAND ON ITS OWN FEET AND MUCH OF THE INSURGENTS' MOMENTUM WOULD BE LOST. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE INSURGENTS HAVE TAKEN GREAT LOSSES AND WERE NOT WELL SITUATED TO ATTACK. WE BELIEVE THAT ANY CONCERTED ATTEMPT TO TAKE PHNOM PENH NOW WILL SURELY FAIL. THE INSURGENTS' PROBLEM IS THUS HOW TO KEEP UP MILITARY PRESSURE WITHOUT TAKING THE ONUS OF DEFEAT. WE SAID WE DOUBTED THERE WAS ANY SATISFACTORY WAY OUT OF THE DILEMMA, BUT ON BALANCE EXPECT THAT NEW ATTACKS ON AT CONFIDENTIAL

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LEAST SOME SMALL SCALE WILL BE MADE AGAINST PHNOM PENH. WE ADDED THAT WHEN THESE ATTACKS FAIL IT WILL BE APPARENT THAT WE HAVE A SITUATION OF MILITARY STALEMATE HERE AND THAT THE TIME SHOULD BE RIGHT FOR A CONCERTED EFFORT TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING. SURELY THE SOVIET UNION AS THE GREATEST SOCIALIST POWER WILL BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE NEW KHMER COMMUNIST PARTY AND HANOI IN THE DIRECTION OF NEGOTIATION.

- 6. SHMANEVSKI SAID HE DOUBTED THAT THEY HAD MUCH INFLUENCE BUT HE AGREED WITH OUR OVERALL VIEW OF THE SITUATION (SIC).
- 7. SHMANEVSKI SAID THAT HIS TWO SENIORS IN THE SOVIET MISSION HERE, ANATOLI GRIGORIEV AND EVGUENI KOMISSARTCHOUK ARE BOTH "ON VACATION" IN THE SOVIET UNION AND UNLIKELY TO RETURN. HE SAYS THAT THE MISSION HAS NO INTENTION TO EVACUATE AND EXPECTS TO "WAIT OUT THE CRISIS". SWANK

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